The not proven verdict and related reforms

Before I read the consultation paper, I was about equally in favour of retaining all 3 verdicts, and returning to proven/not proven. I will expand on the latter in my answer to Q2. Having read the paper, however, I am tending towards the retention of all 3, as a safeguard (particularly if, for instance, corroboration were to be removed). Also before reading the full paper, I wondered why it would not just be possible to explain the 2 non-guilty verdicts better - I had not realized that "not proven" lacks a statutory definition (see also Q2 below).

Given that an accused is innocent until "proven" guilty, and that the onus is on the crown to prove guilt, it makes much more sense to me to have these as the 2 verdicts, should there be a change. "Not guilty" has a more definitive implication, perhaps, asserting an absence of guilt, rather than an absence of ability in the crown's part to prove the accusation - but does that reflect reality? Maybe sometimes it will be "beyond reasonable doubt" that the accused did not commit the crime, but in such cases, the prosecution service should have dropped the case earlier. I also believe that these were the 2 original verdicts in Scots Law, and that NG is the interloper; reverting to prior practice would please me.

It's easier to say how it should not be defined! There is a perception that it equates to "he did it but we can't prove it" - this needs to be dispelled. Not Proven is perhaps most likely to be used where there is little or no corroboration (so extra important to keep it as an option if corroboration is removed) and the jury are assessing one person's word against another's. Not guilty is a definite assertion that the accused did not commit the crime (see Q2 above); not proven is a judgment of the prosecution's case rather than the person accused.
Looking at Q4, the difficulty of defining it is made very clear. With the exception of reaching a compromise in the jury room (where it's clearly inappropriate; that's what majority verdicts are for), I struggled to answer. If I say they are all inappropriate, then when is it appropriate? But I don't want to perpetuate the idea that it's not really an acquittal (even if it technically is) because there's a whiff of guilt remaining. I did after much thought decide the first 3 scenarios could be appropriate, provided it is made clear to all concerned, including the public, that these are not the only circumstances in which NP can be the verdict, so that there is no automatic assumption along "he did it really" lines. It's also unsubtle (as are all verdicts); there would be no way to distinguish between the scenarios you have listed.

I think it highlights to the jury the need to assess whether the prosecution have made their case. Is it or is it not beyond reasonable doubt?

Because of the perception I mentioned above that the accused was guilty but that that couldn't be proved, there can be a stigma, and people unhappy with the verdict could exploit that. This consultation highlights the overall need to better educate the public about the verdicts, and to have tighter definitions; that would help to remove stigma.

It should only cause a problem if they believe that the accused "got away with it". Again, better education would help.

I don't think anything should be changed. An odd number is desirable so that there can always be a majority. 15 people can easily participate in discussions, if the foreman/woman facilitates that. The stuff about expenses and business staff levels looks like special pleading; a very weak argument - especially the bit about Covid, which I hope will not always be an issue. Surely you wouldn't reduce the number for Covid and then put it back up again? If not, Covid is irrelevant. It also looks like an afterthought tagged on at the end because you don't really have any good reasons for changing the number.
8 is a perfectly adequate number for a majority - and should remain the criterion even if some jurors depart. Consequently, the quorum for the trial to continue must be more than 8. No need to change it from 12. I understand that the actual split in a non-unanimous verdict is never revealed, not even to accused, complainer, or legal professionals. Also which alternative verdict(s) the dissenters favoured is not stated. It therefore cannot be known how often the split is 8:7 and how often it is some other proportion. Changing a simple majority requirement into 2/3rds, for instance, might make no difference in practice, even if superficially it looks as if more certainty is required for a conviction. A simple majority is just that - simple. Choosing a different proportion requires justification of whatever number is chosen.

This also is a difficult question. I feel that changing the requirement then necessitates justification of whatever alternative is chosen, and that this will be contentious. Since I do not favour reduction in the number of jurors, adoption of the E&W system is not an option. 2/3rds of 15, however, would amount to the same thing in purely numerical terms. Unanimity should definitely not be required.

As I stated in the previous section, I understand that we don't know how often an 8:7 split allows someone to be convicted when almost as many jurors disagree (it might be extremely rare, or very common!) and neither do we know what alternative was favoured. If the number of verdicts were reduced, of course, we would know. If I've misunderstood, all this is irrelevant.

Of course it should be an acquittal. If the criterion for conviction is a certain proportion, then failing to achieve that is the opposite of conviction. If acquittal were to require eg 10 out of 15, it is possible that there would be inconclusive cases. (Again, if I'm right that we never know the proportions, the likelihood of this is hard to assess.) That resembles the problems caused by a need for unanimity.
I also don't think it would be right to have eg a simple majority for a conviction, but a qualified majority for an acquittal - that does not sit well with the presumption of innocence.

I understand the issues with crimes committed in private. Nevertheless, I think retention of corroboration is vital. Historically (definitely in England; presumably not in Scotland because of corroboration, but the principle applies regardless), there have been wrongful convictions based on confessions obtained under duress. Since the abolition of the death penalty, these convictions could be over-turned, but the wrongly-convicted still suffered and the actual perpetrators still evaded justice.
The definition of corroboration is broad enough to allow convictions. I don't believe the low conviction rate in sexual offences is a consequence of the need for corroboration; there are many more issues with the way such crimes are reported and prosecuted, all of which need attention / reform.
(Although it is not the subject of this consultation I would like to register my total objection to the idea of non-jury trials for such offences, on the farcical grounds that there aren't enough convictions! That implies that juries are numpties, encourages judges to slacken standards - there had better not be a quota! - and denies the accused the right to be judged by his peers.)

Given that I think corroboration should remain even if nothing else is changed, I support its retention even more if there are other alterations.

As above, given that I think corroboration should remain even if nothing else is changed, I support its retention even more if there are other alterations.

It shouldn't be reformed; there's no need. There would also, as you point out, be repercussions for the rest of the legal system. Scots Law is a distinctive and precious thing; that doesn't mean it should be immutable, but any changes have to be justifiable. This one isn't, in my view.

I'm not convinced adequate replacement safeguards exist, which is why I am utterly opposed to removing the requirement. Nevertheless, if it were removed, there would have to be some way of compensating for vexatious complainers/witnesses, or even well-meaning people with incorrect recall (more likely for events long in the past, but it is surprisingly difficult to bear accurate witness, especially if at the time of observation, you don't realize it's going to be evidence - that's another reason for corroboration).

It would be helpful to make it clear that corroboration includes more than just personal observation by a direct witness.

With the possible exception of sex, I don't believe the reforms considered would have any effect on discrimination (either to reduce or worsen it), equality of opportunity or good relations.
It is possible to argue that corroboration affects sexual offences and domestic violence disproportionately. These crimes affect women disproportionately, too. As I have said above, however, I don't think this should be used to push for its removal.
Are some groups more affected by the requirement to do jury service? (Relevant for jury size.) There are exemptions already; perhaps these could be regularly reviewed anyway.

No. I'm pleased that you have listed the correct protected characteristics.

Inasmuch as people have the right to be innocent until proven guilty, perhaps.

Any effect as a result of people having to do jury service in groups of 15 rather than fewer would be marginal. I doubt if island communities would experience additional impact.

No.